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Statutes and the Common Law of Contracts: A 
Shared Methodology 
Juliet P Kostritsky 
I. Introduction 
This chapter explores the intersection between, or the impact of, statutes on contract law, and 
compares the relative importance of, and intersections between, statutory and common law in contract. 
Unquestionably, statutes have increased in importance; ‘we live in a statutory era’.1 Those who highlight 
the rise of statutory intervention in contract often argue that legislative regulation has largely displaced 
the common law of contracts2 and that there is little left to the core of contract law.3  
 To judge the meaning of these statutory developments for contract law, one must situate them 
in context. That context must include not only an understanding of statutes and their institutional role in 
society,4 but also the role of courts in developing common law rules5 – and the particular way in which 
statutes and the common law operate within bargained-for contractual exchange. Traditionally, scholars 
viewed statutes as intrusions into private ordering requiring justification6 while regarding the common 
                                                            
 
1 See D Farber and PP Frickey, ‘In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of New Public Law’ 
(1991) 89 Michigan Law Review 875, 876. See generally G Calabresi, A Common Law For the Age of Statutes 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999). 
2 See eg, EJ Leib, ‘What is the Relational Theory of Consumer Form Contract?’ in J Braucher, J Kidwell and W 
Whitford (eds) Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) 259, 262 
(discussing displacement of contract law in consumer context).  
3 See D Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1985) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 1737 
(discussing the concept of core and periphery in which the core of contract law is deemed to be private and the 
public, regulatory aspects of contract law are marginalised at the periphery). 
4 Scholars of statutory law see problems with legislatures being dominated by ‘special interest groups’ due to 
collective action problems that ‘make it difficult to organize large groups of individuals to seek broadly dispersed 
public goods’. Farber and Frickey, ‘In the Shadow of the Legislature’ (1991) 880.  
5 ibid (finding that there is still a viable role for courts despite legislative onslaught because the types of interest 
group lobbying to solve narrow problems still leaves room for courts to provide remedies when the statutory 
scheme fails to address a problem). They warn ‘against reading negative implications into the precise contours of 
the complicated statutory scheme’. ibid 898. 
6 ibid 875. 
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law of tort, property and contract as embodying an ‘autonomous private order’.7 However, recognising 
that both private law (through common law) and public law (through statutes) intervene in private 
contractual arrangements by adding or forbidding terms may change the traditional dichotomous view. 
The particular intervention, as well as the effects of, and justification for, intervention by courts or the 
legislature into private contracts should be analysed. Intervention must be built on realistic assumptions 
about how parties behave and react to common law rules and statutes8 as well as an assessment of how 
such legal interventions will serve parties’ private goals, or more broadly public ones – thus bringing 
social context into contract law. A comparative approach should also ask: why does intervention follow 
one course rather than another? What approach will best improve goal achievement after accounting 
for the costs of intervention?  
 When is a statutory or common law intervention welfare-enhancing as compared to goal 
achievement without intervention?9 The assessment of intervention by these various ‘institutions’10 
must be made on a comparative basis.11 How much, and in what circumstances, should legislatures 
intervene? When is the legislature better or worse than common law courts in intervening, and why?  
 At one level, because contracts are devised in societies governed by statutes, the parties to 
those contracts must be subject to those laws. A key question, as yet undertheorised, is why and when 
                                                            
7 ibid 885–86. Property, tort and contract operated fundamentally to protect private rights.  
8 The examination of the influence of statutes on contract law necessarily differs from examining the effects of 
statutes on tort law in one important respect – statutes affecting contract law must consider that parties have the 
ability to craft agreements ex ante in a way that tort actors do not. For a thoughtful exploration of the effects of 
statutes on tort law, see TT Arvind and J Steel, ‘Introduction: Legislation and the Scope of Tort Law’ in TT Arvind 
and J Steele (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013). That difference affects intervention 
choices by the legislature. For a discussion of the realistic behavioral assumptions affecting transacting parties see 
OE Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York, The Free Press, 1985) 44–50. 
9 Assessing welfare enhancement must include a comparative assessment of whether intervention by a legislature 
or court will help the parties achieve their desired goals without introducing costs that reduce the overall net 
benefits when compared to non-intervention. As Professor Coffey explains: ‘the intervention must promise a net-
of-cognizable-intervention-costs improvement of goal achievement (as compared to the level of desired effect 
reached without intervention)’. RJ Coffey, ‘Methodological Perspective’ (2002) 6 A manuscript by my colleague. 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
10 If broadly defined, courts, private exchanges and statutes are institutions. ‘Institutions define and limit the set of 
choices of individuals.’ DC North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 4, 2nd edn 
(Cambridge University Press. USA1990). ‘Institutions include any form of constraint that human beings devise to 
shape human interaction.’ ibid. These institutions also extend to private organisations like the New York Stock 
Exchange, which establishes rules to govern the voluntary arrangements of participants who join. See, eg, the NYSE 
Rules, at http://wallstreet.cch.com/nyse/rules (2019).  
11 See O Williamson, Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996) 7 (discussing 
remediableness ‘according to which an outcome for which no superior alternative can be described with net gains 
is presumed to be efficient’); N Komesar, ‘In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative 
Institutional Alternative’ (1980) 79 Michigan Law Review 1350, 1350 (examining different decision-makers and 
evaluating them according to a criterion of ‘choosing the best, or least imperfect, institution to implement a given 
societal goal’). In this chapter, a comparative analysis also assesses legal intervention against leaving the solution 
to parties’ private strategies. 
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statutes or common law rules would be needed to govern, supplement or forbid parties’ private 
arrangements, and whether statutes and the common law share a common methodology. Examining 
statutes and moving beyond a merely case-centric view of contracts prompts a new insight: not only do 
statutes influence the common law of contracts, but also that statutes and common law interventions in 
contracts are driven by the same taxonomy – a shared methodology – of intervening to add terms when 
obstacles prevent the parties from reaching a complete contract, the costs of intervention do not 
outweigh the benefits, and such intervention will improve welfare.12  
 Courts intervene in contracts in many ways: they may add trade usages or default rules of 
remedies or fiduciary duties to an agreement, forbid certain contractual waivers (as in the implied 
warranty of habitability13), or withhold enforcement.14 Statutes also intervene in private contracts by 
providing background default rules; other statutes regulate contracts by mandating certain disclosure or 
forbidding certain contracts.  
 This chapter treats statutory and judicial interventions – through the common law of rule 
formulation and extension – as different forms of collective intervention into private contracts. In the 
financial contracting literature,15 intervention refers to cases in which courts or legislatures take actions 
that add or subtract terms from parties’ contracts or refuse to enforce private contracts,16 rather than 
letting the market operate without any interference. 
 With either legislative or common law intervention in contracts,17 the goals of the contracting 
parties provide the foundation for analysis. In any exchange, parties seek to maximise surplus while 
minimising costs. Contract law ‘allow[s] parties to act in a manner consistent with their voluntary 
preferences’.18 Thus, intervention, whether by common law courts or the legislature, should depend on 
                                                            
12 See JS Wiley, Jr, ‘A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism’ (1986) 99 Harvard Law Review 713, 749 fn 167 (cited 
in TJ Zywicki, ‘A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An Institutional Comparison of 
Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number Externality Problems’ (1996) 46 Case Western Reserve 
Law Review 961, 966 fn 17) (explaining Pareto efficiency as holding ‘one condition to be superior to another only if 
at least one person is better off and no one is worse off’). 
13 WZ Hirsch, JG Hirsch and S Margolis, ‘Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws Upon Rent: An 
Empirical Observation of the Ackerman-Komesar Debate’ (1975) 63 California Law Review 1098. 
14 See part IX below (discussing denying enforcement to contracts with forbidden terms). 
15 The intervention question – whether courts or legislatures should intervene in parties’ private contracts – arises 
in the context of securities laws. Scholars analyse whether securities laws will enhance efficiency and improve 
welfare. See FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors’ (1984) 70 
Virginia Law Review 669. 
16 See UCC § 2-302. 
17 For an example of the scholarly recognition of the importance of statutes in contracts, see generally Q Zhou and 
L DiMatteo, ‘Three Sales Laws and the Common law of Contracts’ in Comparative Contract Law: British and 
American Perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015).  
18 PM Gerhart, JP Kostritsky and RJ Coffey, ‘The Birth of an Interventional Choice – A Justificational Analysis’ 
(summer 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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whether the parties can achieve and maximise welfare on their own, or whether transaction costs or 
other bargaining obstacles prevent that. Could the parties achieve their goals through pure contract 
without needing to resort to governmental enforcement or other collective interventions – 
interventions that entail costs? How can governmental intervention, either in the form of a common law 
rule or statute, or some combination of statute and common law,19 facilitate contracting and help the 
parties achieve goals that they could not achieve on their own? Finally, when should common law courts 
or legislatures forbid or mandate certain terms in a contract or otherwise intervene in private contracts? 
 To assess the welfare effects of certain interventions, courts and legislatures should use 
empirical studies to evaluate whether ‘a particular set of institutional terms may reduce [costs] (by 
comparison to one or more possible term sets) without introducing new costs that offset or exceed the 
costs introduced’;20 that comparison will determine if one intervention is superior to another by 
achieving articulated goals more efficiently.21 Constant readjustment of intervention and comparison 
may be needed to avoid ‘unintended consequences’22 that add costs to contracts without solving 
problems. 
 This chapter in part II considers differences and similarities between legislatures and courts. Part 
III examines private ordering that successfully navigates problems between two parties without any 
collective intervention. Parts IV and V use that baseline to explain why and when a court or a legislature 
would intervene in a private arrangement. Part IV describes when legislatures and courts might add 
norms or trade usages of private parties to the parties’ contract – a form of intervention by adding non-
adjudicable norms23 to an express contract through an incorporation strategy – and part V discusses 
when and why legislatures and courts might add remedial default rules. Part VI examines how legislative 
intervention may be required to achieve goals parties cannot accomplish on their own by contract. Part 
VII discusses when statutes and common law rules facilitate contracting by minimising transaction costs 
and maximising value. Part VIII examines when intervention should take the form of mandated 
disclosure and who should develop the parameters for such disclosures. When are mandated 
disclosures effective and when does mandated disclosure fail as a solution to informational asymmetries 
and other contracting problems? Part IX examines what effect, if any, legislative prohibitions have on 
the common law of contracts. If legislatures forbid the inclusion of certain terms in contracts, when and 
                                                            
19 Federal Rule 10b-5 is a legislative anti-fraud provision, but the content of insider trading rules derives largely 
from common law cases on duty. See JC Coffee, Jr, ‘Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, 
Gaps and Strategies’ [2013] ECGI Working Paper Series in Law 204, 4. 
20 Email from Ronald J Coffey, Professor Emeritus, Case Western Reserve University, to Professor Juliet P 
Kostritsky, Case Western Reserve University (1 June 2013, on file with author). 
21 Because achievement of one goal may hinder achievement of another goal, intervenors – whether legislatures 
or courts – need to confront the concept of covariance, asking ‘how much of one must be foregone to capture a 
measure of the other.’ Coffey (n 9). 
22 See O Ben-Shahar and CE Schneider, ‘The Failure of Mandated Disclosure’ (2011) 159 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 647, 647. 
23 See, eg, J Kraus, ‘Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms’ (1997) 26 Journal of Legal Studies377; RE 
Scott, ‘The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms’ (2000) 86 Virginia Law Review 1603. 
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why do parties contract around legislative provisions to achieve their private goals?24 What do all of 
these interventions and their effects suggest about any limits on governmental interventions as well as 
the need to constantly reevaluate the effectiveness of interventions using a method that examines all 
costs and benefits?  
 By providing a justificatory framework for intervention tied to bargaining obstacles,25 the 
success of private ordering in certain contexts, and a method of comparing costs and benefits of 
intervention by different institutions, one can assess whether and why certain interventions are 
effective, and why others fail. These insights can guide future interveners – whether legislatures or 
courts – in private contracts.  
II. Courts and Legislatures: Differences and Similarities 
To fully understand why and how statutes passed by legislatures and rules developed by courts 
intervene in parties’ contracts, the general role that statutes and common law courts play deserves 
scrutiny. Courts and legislatures operate in different realms; courts only address disputes that are 
brought to them by one of the parties whereas legislatures can proactively identify a problem without 
having to wait for a party to initiate the process, gathering information before drafting statutes to 
address those problems.26 Statutes state general rules applicable to a wide class of parties;27 courts’ 
decisions are narrowly targeted to the parties’ dispute.28  
 While institutional differences certainly exist between courts and legislatures,29 at a 
fundamental level there is a commonality in the decision to enact a statute or to develop a common law 
rule in the context of a particular case. When common law courts decide cases and interpret precedent, 
or create an exception to prior precedent, they inevitably do more than decide the controversy ex post. 
                                                            
24 See, eg, S Sanga, ‘Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Approach’ (2018) 34 Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization 650.  
25 JP Kostritsky, ‘Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in An Imperfect World: What to Do When Parties Have 
Not Achieved Bargains Or Have Drafted Incomplete Contracts’ [2004] Wisconsin Law Review 323.  
26 See L Anderlini, L Felli and A Riboni, ‘Statute Law or Case Law’ (1 July 2008), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1168662; Farber and Frickey (n 1). See also RA Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed 
(New York, Wolters Kluwer, 2007) § 19.3 (discussing legislative considerations, and inefficiencies, in lawmaking). 
27 For that reason, statutes can appropriately act when there are large groups of homogeneous parties that would 
be subject to a rule and flexibility is not required. See I Ehrlich and RA Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking’ (1974) 3 Journal of Legal Studies 257 (discussing ‘a relatively broad span of activity’ characteristic of 
legislation).  
28 See Calabresi, A Common Law (1999).  
29 Email from Professor Peter M Gerhart, Case Western Reserve University to Professor Juliet P Kostritsky, Case 
Western Reserve University (5 July 2018, on file with author). 
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This is because prior case law necessarily ‘underdetermines’30 the outcome of subsequent cases. In 
making decisions about the parameters of the holding of a prior case that differs from the current case, 
a court must resort to a normative framework. That is why ‘economic theory treats common law 
adjudication, especially of hard cases, as the effective equivalent of legislating new legal rules’.31 
 If courts use a framework that references goals and a model of behaviour of the parties, then 
judicial decision-making resembles legislation. Although cases are decided ex post after events have 
occurred32 a court deciding a case must reference how the decision – including particular rule 
formulations or implied terms – will promote parties’ private goals, including welfare maximisation. 
Legislatures passing statutes that affect private contracts will also consider how the legislation will affect 
the goals of future parties deciding to enter contracts. If a legislature considers social goals, it should 
also consider the effects on private parties. That will enable it to determine if the overall benefits of 
addressing those externalities33 outweigh the costs of intervention. 
III. Private Ordering without Intervention or Contracting 
Because the protection of private contracts is essential, in judging the justification for, and effects of, 
statutory and judicial intervention, one should first consider the realm of private transacting where 
parties resolve matters between themselves rather than adopt an explicitly enforceable contract. If 
parties reach an accommodation on their own completely outside of contract, legal intervention, 
whether judicial or legislative, would be superfluous.  
 Understanding the commonalities in the rule-making of courts and legislatures that add terms to 
contracts may be easier if one examines how parties reach an exchange resolution without an 
adjudicator of any kind being involved, and devise informal constraints. Parties could later devise 
contracts to address the same controversy and invoke third-party enforcement.  
 In general, parties will try to achieve their goals while minimising the costs of doing so.34 If there 
are no barriers to the parties reaching an exchange and they do not do so, there would presumably be 
                                                            
30 R Craswell, ‘Do Trade Customs Exist’ in JS Kraus and SD Walt (eds), The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate 
and Commercial Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000); JS Kraus and SD Walt, ‘In Defense of the 
Incorporation Strategy’ in Kraus and Walt (eds), Jurisprudential Foundations (ibid) at 122.  
31 J Kraus, ‘The Methodological Commitments of Contemporary Contract Theory’ in JL Coleman and S Shapiro 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook On Jurisprudence And Legal Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002). A narrow 
view of judicial decision-making might argue to the contrary that ‘every pronouncement of legal decisionmakers is 
so nuanced by factual peculiarities that it cannot be interpreted as based on value selection’. Coffey, 
Methodological Perspective (n 9) at 4.  
32 That difference of courts addressing issues ex post leads courts to address issues ‘myopically.’ See Anderlini et 
al, ‘Statute Law’ (2008) 1. 
33 See AC Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 4th edn (London, Macmillan, 1932) 192 (discussing the link between 
externalities and legislative intervention) (cited in Zywicki, ‘A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model’ (1996) 961). 
34 Gerhart, Kostritsky and Coffey, ‘The Birth of an Interventional Choice’ (2005). 
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little welfare justification for legal intervention. The absence of a contract would reflect the parties’ 
determination that no welfare improvements could be gained from an exchange. An example follows.  
 Imagine two next-door neighbors, one playing loud music and the other objecting to it.35 Each 
party knows who the other is and can identify the source of the noise. Not knowing exactly how the law 
would address the problem were they to complain, they might reach a resolution: one party – the noise 
objector – might take out the noisemaker’s garbage, hoping the noisemaker turns down the volume. 
Alternatively, the noisemaker could take out the garbage of the noise objector to deter complaints. 
Either resolution would comprise a private arrangement that internalises the externality of the loud 
music – a kind of implicit contract or private strategy.36 Alternately, the parties could adjust their 
behaviour by conforming to a norm.37 In these cases, there is no need for any judicial or statutory 
intervention. When there are no obvious barriers to a private agreement, a court is unlikely to intervene 
with implied terms. Likewise, a legislature is unlikely to intervene to regulate the controversy. There are 
no market imperfections and no gains from trade. 
IV. Non-adjudicable Norm Omitted from Express Contract: Should Law 
Add a Term? 
The noise controversy example illustrates how parties reach private solutions. They could have but did 
not reach a contractual solution; instead, they selected another institution – a non-adjudicable private 
strategy. Numerous other examples of private arrangements operating without collective governmental 
intervention in contract or exchange exist. For example, the Maghribi traders successfully developed a 
norm that constrained the behaviour of agents and also developed private mechanisms for enforcement 
where state power was undeveloped.38 Another norm might standardise weights and measures to 
‘minimise … measurement costs in markets’.39 In the example of the neighbors with the noise problem 
(outlined above), a private contractual practice with respect to neighbors’ modulation of the music 
volume and trash collection could become prevalent as a general norm for noise controversies (in the 
community).   
                                                            
35 ibid. 
36 Implicit contracts can exist between employers and employees and these implicit arrangements deal with 
unexpected changes (such as slackening demand). Because third-party observers ‘are not sufficiently informed’ 
and explicit contracts will not be achievable, parties will rely on implicit contracts that are self-enforcing due to 
self-interest. C Azariadis, ‘Implicit Contracts’ in J Eatwell, M Milgate and P Newman (eds), Allocation Information 
and Markets (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1982). See also C Bull, ‘The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit 
Contracts’ (1987) 102 Quarterly Journal of Economics 147.  
37 Gerhart, Kostritsky and Coffey (n 18). 
38 See A Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 59–63. 
39 RE Zupko, Revolution in Measurement: Western European Weights and Measures in the Age of Science 
(Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 1990) 183–84. 
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 How norms become incorporated into law as additional terms of a contract through common 
law default rules40 or through statues41 should be analysed under a common methodology. The decision 
to add terms or to intervene should depend on a cost comparison of a self-enforcing norm and ‘the 
costs of alternative arrangements – such as common law, statute, and the particular advantage and 
disadvantage of each solution in such contracts’.42 
 When norms develop, intervention by either courts or a legislature might arise as an issue if 
parties fail to adhere to a norm. Those aware of a ‘propensity to diverge’43 might include the norm as an 
express term of their contract. But if the parties fail to include the norm or practice in their contract, a 
court or a legislature faces the issue of whether to intervene by incorporating the norm as a term in the 
contract. A court or legislature might decide that the best practice would be one of non-interference 
through legal recognition of the norm. They use the norm as an input44 or source for the legal 
intervention. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) adopts such an incorporation strategy by making 
trade usages, course of performance and course of dealing automatically part of the parties’ 
agreement.45 Courts also incorporate trade usages into parties’ contracts, often to control opportunistic 
behaviour.46  
 If a court or the legislature adverts to the goals of the contracting parties in deciding whether 
intervention to add norms to a contract would improve welfare, it could recognise such norms to save 
the parties the transaction costs of expressly incorporating them. That strategy might be cost-
minimising when the parties use customary language, not realising that they would need to translate 
those customary meanings into express terms in order for the express terms to include their customary 
meanings.47 The transaction costs thus include not just drafting but even the costs of conceptualising 
that there is a need to draft.48 
                                                            
40 See JP Kostritsky, ‘The Law and Economics of Norms’ (2013) 48 Texas International Law Journal 465, 497.  
41 See UCC § 2-202.  
42 Kostritsky, ‘Norms’ (2013) 483. 
43 Email from Ronald J Coffey, Professor Emeritus, Case Western Reserve University, to Juliet P Kostritsky, Case 
Western Reserve University (2 May 1996, on file with author). 
44 Kostritsky (n 40) 485. 
45 UCC § 2-201(b)(3). UCC § 2-202 provides that unless the parties explicitly negate them, the parties’ private 
norms and trade usages can be used to explain or supplement parties’ private contracts. 
46 See JP Kostritsky, ‘Judicial Incorporation of Trade Usages: A Functional Solution to the Opportunism Problem’ 
(2006) 39 Connecticut Law Review 451. 
47 Kraus and Walt (n 30) 199 (discussing increased specification costs). See also Kostritsky (n 40) 498. 
48 Kraus and Walt (n 30) 199. See also JP Kostritsky, ‘Contract Interpretation: Judicial Rule Not Party Choice’ in 
Larry DiMatteo Qi Zhou, Severine Saintier, and Keith Rowley (eds), Commercial Contract Law: A Transatlantic 
Perspective (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 258 fn 92. There is an accent over the e in Severine JK 
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 A court or legislature deciding whether to add norms to a contract and then to enforce such an 
augmented contract should consider whether the parties have already reached implicit or non-
adjudicable norms or practices that are effectively self-enforcing. If not, would legal recognition and 
enforcement of a norm enhance value for both parties by saving on specification costs49 or by curbing 
the prospect of opportunistic behaviour? Non-adjudicable norms might be self-enforcing, or might 
depend on enforcement by third-party organisations. Conventions such as driving on the right side of 
the road would be self-enforcing, whereas informal norms dealing with measurement of weights in 
merchant trade might develop privately and then depend on additional third-party sanctions.  
 The incorporation decision, whether in the form of a statutory or judicial decision to incorporate 
the norm, should depend on the common methodology – the justificatory framework for assessing all 
interventions in private exchanges. Does the legal formalisation adopting the content of the eligible 
input of a norm or the legal enforcement of a norm (two separate questions) save parties’ costs and 
increase surplus?  
 A court or legislature might decide not to intervene to incorporate the norm as a term of the 
contract if it viewed the norm as an implicit understanding that the parties intended to enforce solely 
through private means of enforcement.50 A legislature or court might also decline to enforce the norm if 
the lawmaker concluded that the parties would want the flexibility to depart from following the norm to 
respond to circumstances – opting to not be bound to a past practice.51 The court or legislature would 
be more likely to decline to adopt the norm if it believed the parties could bargain or rebargain once the 
issue had surfaced.52 Finally, if parties are better able to judge whether the norm should apply,53 a court 
or legislature might decline to adopt the norm.  
 If, however, the court or the legislature decides that norms save parties costs by policing 
opportunism that would otherwise act as a drag on gains from trade, a court or legislature might decide 
to incorporate the norm into private contracts. In that way, intervention might help parties achieve 
more of what they wanted ex ante by policing a behaviour – opportunism – that would otherwise 
decrease gains from trade.54 Intervention would therefore be welfare-enhancing. The legal decision-
maker in deciding whether to incorporate the private norm into the contract – either by a statute or 
                                                            
49 Kraus and Walt (n 30) 193. 
50 These include threats of reputational or other enforcement mechanisms such as a collective boycott. Greif, 
Institutions (2006).  
51 See Kraus and Walt (n 30) 208. 
52 See A Schwartz and J Watson, ‘The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting’ (2004) 20 Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 2 (examining party preferences on whether renegotiation should be restricted).  
53 Kraus and Walt (n 30) 208. 
54 See Williamson, ‘Economic Institutions’ (1985) 33–36 (connecting need to minimise opportunism to increased 
gains from trade).  
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common law rule – will consider the deadweight losses from uncontrolled opportunism as well as 
potential mistakes by decision-makers in understanding the norm.55  
 Legal recognition of private norms – a type of intervention – should thus depend in part on 
whether the adopting lawmaker thinks that, as a general matter, courts or legislatures would be able to 
facilitate the achievement of the parties’ goals by aptly discerning norms, in effect deferring to the 
parties’ express arrangements,56 or declining to enforce such norms unless the parties expressly 
incorporated them.57 Norm incorporation may also depend on whether a court or legislature thinks that 
legally enforcing or recognising a norm will crowd out or complement private enforcement strategies 
parties have, because crowding out would be considered a cost of intervention.58  
 This structured methodology for explaining why courts might intervene by adding terms such as 
norms to private contracts based on the barriers to contracting can also explain instances in which 
statutory interventions add to the parties’ terms through default rules, such as the UCC Article 2 default 
rules or statutory or common law fiduciary duty rules. These statutes or common law rules can be 
justified as assisting the parties in achieving their private goals by helping them overcome costs or 
obstacles that private counterstrategies could not solve or when such strategies would be more costly 
than a law-supplied rule.59 It can also explain why remedial default rules exist.60 
V. Private Agreements Formed without Statutes: Government 
Intervention to Enforce or Add Remedial Defaults 
When barriers to contracting do not exist, parties can form a business association by deliberately 
entering into an enforceable contract. There is no need for a statute – a collective intervention – telling 
the parties how to split the profits. However, unless the parties could depend solely on informal 
                                                            
55 See Kraus and Walt (n 30) 194 (discussing the problem of errors in incorporation strategy).  
56 See DV Snyder, ‘Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and Conduct’ (2001) 
54 SMU Law Review 617, 618 (‘Custom ... is part of the language that parties use to express themselves to each 
other’). 
57 This approach would run counter to § 2-202, which assumes that norms (trade usages, etc) will be incorporated 
unless specifically negated. See UCC § 2-202 cmt 2. 
58 See JP Kostritsky, ‘A Bargaining Dynamic Transaction Cost Approach to Understanding Framework Contracts’ 
(2019) 68 American University Law Review 1621, 1693 (discussing crowding out). If the law crowds out private or 
self-enforcement, legal intervention could add to the costs of goal achievement. There are reasons to think that 
crowding out concerns are exaggerated or misplaced.  
59 Coffey, email (n 43). See also RJ Coffey, ‘This is the Way I Would Set Up the Intractability Analysis’ (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
60 For default rules to persist, they must ‘solve a problem that a reasonable portion of contractors will face in a 
way that is acceptable to those contractors.’ A Schwartz, ‘The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract 
Law’ (1993) 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 389, 392. This ‘acceptability constraint’ (ibid) is 
consistent with the common methodology described in this chapter – legal intervention is justified only when the 
benefits of the intervention outweigh any offsetting costs of intervention (or inaction). 
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reputational sanctions, they might need to resort to a court to enforce the partnership. If the court 
decided to enforce the contract by awarding damages, it would be adding a remedial default rule – a 
form of collective intervention.  
 Professor Whitford has recently suggested that eliminating all default rule contractual remedies 
would cause parties to be reluctant to contract at all, or they might ‘demand a larger risk premium’.61 
Therefore, courts may decide that intervening in private contracts by adding a remedial default rule is 
justified because ‘it is hard to believe the benefits of eliminating the availability of remedies as a default 
remedy would exceed its costs’.62 This intervention is consistent with the welfare-maximising common 
methodology articulated here. 
 The justification for supplying a remedial default rule is that it will minimise costs for the parties 
– the same justification that underlies other decisions by courts or legislatures to add other terms to 
parties’ contracts. A remedial default rule saves parties the costs that they would otherwise incur if they 
had to charge a premium to make up for the absence of such defaults without creating new offsetting 
costs that outweigh the costs saved.  
 The British courts’ decision at common law to adopt expectation damages as a default rule, 
adding to every contract damages calculated on the position that the party would have been in had the 
contract been performed,63 is based on the parties’ bargain. One recent argument explained that the 
success of remedial default rules is because they are ‘formulas [that] are transcontextual because they 
are content free’.64 The fact that the remedial default takes the form of a ‘transcontextual’ formula that 
is tied to the parties’ own deal and is easily applied satisfies the cost analysis, but is not a reason for its 
adoption as a default rule. Courts could have declined to adopt a remedial default rule at all, forcing 
parties to stipulate to damages in every contract. Courts could have adopted an altogether different 
remedial default rule such as punitive damages. That courts adopted a default rule of expectation 
damages and used a formula to achieve that goal evidences that courts wanted to avoid the costs of 
parties needing to charge a premium for the absence of default rules. It wanted a rule that, because of 
the formula, would not impose offsetting costs that outweighed the benefits and would not lead to 
costly inefficiencies of a contrary rule, such as punitive damages.65 
                                                            
61 See WC Whitford, ‘A Relational Perspective on Contract Law’s Default Rules, With An Emphasis on Remedies’ in 
D Campbell and R Halsom (eds), Research Handbook in Private Law Remedies (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2019). 
62 ibid 31. 
63 A Schwartz and RE Scott, ‘The Common Law of Contract and the Default Rule Project’ (2016) 102 Virginia Law 
Review 1523, 1547. See also Robinson v Harman (1848) 154 ER 363, 365, 1 Ex 850, 855 (‘[W]here a party sustains a 
loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with 
respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed.’) 
64 Schwartz and Scott, Default Rule Project’ (2016) 1523. 
65 Expectation damages encourage efficient breach whereas punitive damages may discourage efficient breaches. 
See eg, G Klass, ‘Efficient Breach’ in G Klass, G Letsas, and P Saprai (eds), The Philosophical Foundations of Contract 
Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 362–87 (‘[T]he theory of efficient breach ... recommends expectation 
damages because expectation damages give parties a reason to perform when and only when performance will 
increase overall social welfare.’). But see WS Dodge, ‘The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts’ (1999) 48 Duke 
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 A further question with remedial default rules for damages is whether the default rule should be 
added by a legislative rule or a judicially developed default rule. Default rule remedial issues arise when 
the parties have already reached a bargain. There is thus no need for the legislature to intervene to 
solve an externality problem that the parties cannot solve by contract. Should the legislature 
nonetheless have a role in designing remedial default rules? Would that intervention be better than a 
judicially supplied default rule? Damage default rules might best be developed by courts when no 
externalities are present, the cost of not supplying a remedy is welfare-reducing, and courts can slowly 
develop the contours of the remedial default scheme including the role of mitigation, uncertainty and 
foreseeability, and the theories of damages informed by scholarship of great contracts scholars such as 
Fuller and Purdue.66 Bright line rules for some aspects of remedies seem inappropriate, so incremental 
consideration through case law would have a comparative advantage. However, once a remedial 
scheme is fully developed by courts, a legislature might enact a remedial default scheme for a particular 
context, such as the sale of goods.67  
VI. Statutes Intervening to Help Parties Achieve Goals they could not 
Achieve Privately 
The inability to bargain to a solution affects the decision and the manner in which the legislature 
intervenes. A statute may solve a problem that parties could not solve by private agreement, or could 
not solve because of budget constraints. If the parties are unknown, bargains cannot be negotiated. 
Several examples illustrate the advantage of legislative intervention to solve contracting problems: first, 
to regulate dog owners, second, to provide unlimited liability for corporations and third, to enact 
bankruptcy statutes. When an exchange cannot be achieved at all, relying on the common law of 
contracts with its commitment to enforcing private agreements will not work. Legislatures seem 
uniquely situated to intervene and have advantages over intervention by a court because, without a 
contract being formed, the role a court could play would be a null set. Thus, the inability to reach an 
agreement by contracting may justify legislative intervention by regulation if the common methodology 
indicates that intervention will increase overall welfare when the benefits outweigh the offsetting costs. 
In other instances, where the contract is achieved but incomplete, the legislature may add a term. 
A. Solving Externalities 
Collective intervention by legislatures responds to difficulties that parties face solving a problem by 
contract. A private contractual resolution may not occur when the parties do not directly interact. 
Private norms or private contracting might fail to solve externality problems, as when dog owners fail to 
                                                            
Law Journal 629 (arguing that punitives are more efficient because costs of forcing the breaching party to 
negotiate for a liability release are lower than costs of litigation of establishing expectancy damages). 
66 LL Fuller and W Purdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages’ (1936–37) 46 Yale Law Journal 52 
(examining protection of the reliance interest as a separate element of damages).  
67 See, eg, UCC §§ 2-703–715. 
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clean up after their dogs.68 Yet, a contract between the offending dog owners and the homeowner 
victims would likely be difficult to achieve.69 Without extraordinary search costs, the homeowner could 
not know which dog owner had failed to supervise their dog. The law might intervene and pass a statute 
requiring owners to pick up dog litter or face sanctions. Statutory intervention would respond to the 
difficulty of the parties reaching a bargain on their own.70 The passage of such a law might in turn 
facilitate public norms,71 demonstrating a successful interplay of different institutions, both public and 
private, to solve problems. 
 The comparison for intervention should consider several costs. First, there are transactions costs 
(as the cost of reaching bargains with pet owners regarding negative externalities of pet activity). There 
is also the cost of legal intervention and the associated cost of legal enforcement. However, that latter 
cost may be mitigated by a norm that arises to report violators once the law is passed. So there are 
contracting costs, the costs of judicial action in trespass (as an alternative institutional solution), and the 
cost of legal intervention as reduced by informal norm enforcement. A comparison suggests that legal 
intervention in the form of a ‘pooper scooper’ law is the most effective solution to an externality 
problem as the transaction costs of private agreements are high, judicial intervention in contracts is a 
null set (because they don’t exist) and the legislature can intervene with a bright line rule.72 
B. Legislation when Parties cannot Solve: Limited Liability 
A statutory intervention to solve contracting difficulties also explains why legislatures intervene with a 
statute granting corporations limited liability.73 If two parties come together to form a business entity 
for the first time, those parties are entitled to be held liable only to the extent of their capital 
                                                            
68 See DH Cole and PZ Grossman (eds), Principles of Law and Economics (New York, Wolters Kluwer, 2011) 18 
(defining externalities in which ‘some of the costs or benefits associated with the transactions are not borne by 
those participating in the transaction but externalized to others’).  
69 See Kostritsky, ‘Taxonomy’ (2004). 
70 This statutory intervention could also spark informal enforcement by members of the public who would feel 
empowered to informally sanction dog owners who violated the law.  
71 See Scott, ‘The Limits of Behavioral Theories’ (2000) 1603. 
72 This example illustrates how the common methodology of this chapter guides which lawmaker should intervene, 
not merely whether intervention is appropriate. Though statutes have been considered the proper mode of legal 
intervention to solve large-number externality problems, scholars have called into question this ‘conventional 
wisdom’: Zywicki (n 12) 961. Legislatures are prone to ‘overrepresenting third parties not directly involved with the 
issue at hand,’ ibid 983, which ‘Separat[es] influence over results from the costs of those results’: ibid 986. By 
contrast, when a judge is the legal decision-maker to resolve a large-number externality problem, ‘The judge can 
internalize the effects of a decision in a manner that the legislator, acting as a representative of a large voting 
block, cannot’: ibid 989. By considering whether the common law would be more efficient at solving a contract law 
problem than a statute, the common methodology of this chapter is thus illustrative. 
73 Del Code Ann Tit 6, § 18-101. Limited liability becomes a part of an investor’s contract. 
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contributions as against third parties.74 Shareholders are not liable for a firm’s debts or torts. Why 
would the law intervene and protect the initial shareholders by adding a limited liability term to their 
contract? Why couldn’t the shareholders bargain for that limited liability as against third parties? Why 
couldn’t the common law imply a term in the shareholders’ contract with the firm? Normally, common 
law courts supply terms under majoritarian default rules on the theory that both parties would have 
preferred that term.75 However, majoritarian preferences depend on weighing an exchange between 
two contracting parties; it would not ordinarily include a term binding unrelated or unknown third 
parties. Thus, a legislative response would be the only response to solve the problem.  
 The justification for intervention is that the initial parties simply cannot achieve limited liability 
by private contract in such a way as to bind third parties. The law decides that the benefits of 
intervention in the form of a limited liability addition to their contract incentivise parties to invest, and 
that those benefits outweigh any negative externalities. Limited liability thus serves to ‘externalize some 
portion of the business’ total risk exposure to creditors’.76 
C. Legislation to Solve a Timing Problem Hindering Contracts: Bankruptcy 
Another way in which the law can respond to bargaining obstacles that parties cannot resolve privately 
is by solving ‘time-inconsistency problem[s]’ through enactment of bankruptcy statutes.77 Beginning in 
England in 1581,78 the law decided to subject creditor–borrower contracts to the rules of bankruptcy. In 
one sense, the intervention is simply part of the not unremarkable ‘general common law rule that courts 
in construing contracts shall incorporate relevant, unmentioned laws as implied contract terms’.79  
 The law could, however, have declined to intervene by statute and forced parties to contract for 
protections for creditors should a debtor become insolvent. If bankruptcy law were not mandatory, 
creditors would prefer private debt collection remedies that would result in a ‘“run” on the debtor’s 
assets’.80 Because later creditors are unwilling to give up private debt collection even though a co-
ordinated process will maximise value, the law intervenes to maximise the value of the debtor’s assets. 
The unwillingness of creditors to include a co-ordination clause arises because of a ‘time inconsistency 
                                                            
74 S Bainbridge, Corporate Law, 2nd edn (New York, Foundation Press, 2009) 115. 
75 I Ayres and R Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’ (1989) 99 Yale 
Law Journal 87. 
76 ibid 115. 
77 SD Longhofer, ‘Protection for Whom? Creditor Conflict and Bankruptcy’ (2004) 6 American Law and Economics 
Review 249, 253. 
78 An Act Against Such Persons as Do Make Bankrupt 34 & 35 Hen VIII, c 4 (1542–43).  
79 SW Feldman, ‘Statutes and Rules of Law as Implied Contract Terms: The Divergent Approaches and a Proposed 
Solution’ (2017) 19 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 809, 810. 
80 Longhofer, ‘Protection for Whom?’ (2004) 251.  
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problem induced by the sequential nature of a debtor’s contracts with creditors’.81 If there are earlier 
and later lenders to a single borrower, the later lender can offer terms agreeing not to co-ordinate with 
other lenders; that offer comes with a lower interest rate for the borrower that both the later lender 
and the borrower prefer.82 Absent a law mandating co-ordination, creditors will be inclined to ‘get in 
line today (by example, getting a sheriff to execute on the debtor’s equipment)’.83 That may be worse 
for creditors as a whole because holding onto the assets will maximise value.84 The ad hoc liquidation 
that occurs when there is no bankruptcy statute results in deadweight loss85 leading to worse results 
than would occur with legislatively mandated co-ordination.  
 Bankruptcy law solves a problem that creditors do not want to resolve by contract. The time 
sequence problem hinders parties from reaching efficient results. The earlier lenders have terms already 
and will not be able to contract with later lenders because they do not yet exist. The later lenders and 
borrowers borrowing from such lenders will likely refuse co-ordination clauses. Had the lending all 
occurred at the same time with all lenders and borrowers acting together, parties might be incentivised 
to include co-ordination clauses which would maximise value for all creditors when viewed ex ante. 
Because private contractors won’t solve the problem, a judicial response arising out of the common law 
of contracts implying terms in creditor–borrower contracts would be hard to justify under traditional 
models of majoritarian preferences. Statutes, through the addition of the bankruptcy statute as a term 
in all contracts, can overcome private parties’ disinclination to adopt efficient co-ordination clauses 
caused by a time inconsistency problem – a type of bargaining obstacle – and benefit welfare through 
preventing runs on assets which outweigh costs.86 
                                                            
81 ibid 253.  
82 Ibid. 
83 ibid 257. 
84 ibid 250. 
85 ibid 252. 
86 Common law courts’ interpretation of bankruptcy statutes has also interestingly yielded unintended 
consequences when courts depart from the common methodology described in this chapter. One example is in the 
Chrysler bankruptcy. See MJ Roe and D Skeel, ‘Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy’ (2010) 108 Michigan Law Review 
727. Roe and Skeel argue that the Chrysler bankruptcy was presented as a § 363 sale but operated more as a § 
1129 reorganisation (ibid 741). Secured creditors received only 29 cents for every dollar of debt they held, whereas 
unsecured ‘retiree claims were promised well over 50 cents on the dollar’ (ibid 733). The bankruptcy court 
departed from bankruptcy norms (ibid 742–49), and the court’s failure to consider this chapter’s common 
methodology in its statutory interpretation has led to a ‘significant increase in borrowing costs’ for some firms, B 
Baylock, Bullock, A Edwards, and J Stanfield. ‘The Role of Government in the Labor–Creditor Relationship’ (2015) 
50 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 325, 327.  
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VII. Statutes or Common Law Rules to Facilitate Contracting Save 
Parties’ Transaction Costs, Overcome Bargaining Obstacles and 
Develop an Efficient Governance Form 
A. Facilitating Contracts through 2-206 and Constructive Conditions of Exchange 
Statutes also have another function of facilitating contracting by providing off-the-shelf default rules to 
parties’ contracts that parties can use to minimise transaction costs or opt out of if they have 
idiosyncratic preferences that run contrary to the default rules.87 Statutes providing such default rules 
lower the costs of parties who have majoritarian preferences.88 Article 2 of the UCC provides many such 
default rules.89  
 When parties contract, they encounter barriers of various kinds, including bounded rationality, 
opportunism and uncertainty.90 When such barriers to express contractual solutions exist, courts or 
legislatures might intervene in the parties’ contractual arrangement by supplying terms or default rules, 
but only if the benefits of the default rules are greater than any offsetting costs.91 The existence of 
barriers to parties reaching a private agreement justifies interventions – either through the common law 
or legislature – to supply default rules or implied terms to help the parties achieve their goals. Were it 
not for those transaction costs, the parties would have adopted those terms on their own.92 
 Section 2-206 of the UCC exemplifies a statutory default rule governing contract formation than 
can be justified as welfare maximising. Rather than add a term to a contract, 2-206 instead provides a 
default rule to judge contract formation. Unless the parties unambiguously indicate that a particular 
mode or manner of acceptance is required, an offer can be accepted in ‘any manner and by any medium 
                                                            
87 But see O Ben-Shahar and JAE Pottow, ‘On the Stickiness of Default Rules’ (2005) 33 Florida State University Law 
Review 651, 651–53 (arguing that ‘parties might choose not to opt out of a legal default even when a better 
provision can easily be identified and articulated at a negligible drafting cost’ because of the negative costs 
associated with opting out of known default rules resulting in ‘deviance avoidance’).  
88 But see CJ Goetz and RE Scott, ‘The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express 
and Implied Contract Terms’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 261, 285 (arguing that the presumption in contract 
law of consistency of terms within a contract burdens ‘parties who desire to opt out of the legally implied terms by 
trumping them with contrary express provisions’). 
89 See Whitford, ‘Relational Perspective’ (2019). See also Ayres and Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts’ 
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90 The trifecta of these obstacles hinders complete contracts. See Williamson (n 8) 57–59. See also Kostritsky (n 25) 
364–69 (discussing opportunism, sunk costs and uncertainty as barriers to bargaining).  
91 See generally Coffey (n 9). 
92 See Williamson (n 8) 46 (discussing transaction costs as a hindrance to contracting solutions, explaining 




reasonable in the circumstances’.93 This rule rests on the idea that because most offerors are indifferent 
to the manner and mode of acceptance, the default rule should mirror that preference – lowering costs 
for most offerors. The law will not require sellers (acceptors) to accept by an answer in words unless the 
buyer (offeror) mandates such action. This lowers transaction costs by eliminating unnecessary and 
overly formal requirements of contract formation.  
 The 2-206 default rule also lowers another cost of transacting: the risk of opportunism by 
sellers. Without the statute, the following scenario could occur. A seller could ship non-conforming 
goods. If one construes the contract as calling for ‘the act’ of shipment of conforming goods, then the 
seller could escape liability for breach of contract by claiming that the unilateral act that the buyer 
demanded – a shipment of conforming goods – had failed to occur.94 Therefore, a contract would not 
exist and the seller could opportunistically immunise itself from a breach of contract lawsuit.95 Section 
2-206 thus prevents the seller from seizing on a formal technicality to escape liability for contract 
breach.96  
 The UCC prompted changes from the Restatement (First) to the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts on the manner and mode of acceptance, suggesting that the common law was influenced by a 
statutory initiative to provide a comparable solution to opportunism and transaction cost problems of 
overly formal acceptance protocols.97 The Restatement (First), in s 31, reflected the traditional view that 
offerors cared deeply about the manner and mode of acceptance98 and assumed that offerors would 
craft their contract to request either an act or a return promise. If the offer was ambiguous, s 31 
presumed that a bilateral contract was intended, and that offerors intend to permit only one type of 
acceptance. 
 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, adopted in 1981, followed 2-206 by enacting s 30. 
Instead of a preference in favour of a bilateral contract, s 30(2) provides: ‘Unless otherwise 
unambiguously indicated by the language or the circumstances, an offer invites acceptance in any 
manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.’99  
 This sequence demonstrates how a statute may affect the course of the common law by 
eliminating a common law rule that added to parties’ transaction costs.100 The traditional rule, later 
                                                            
93 UCC § 2-206(1). See also UCC § 2-206 cmt. 1.  
94 JJ White and RW Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 6th edn (St Paul, West Publishing, 2000) § 2-6.  
95 ibid.  
96 ibid. 
97 R Braucher, ‘Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement’ (1964) 74 Yale Law Journal 302, 306. 
98 Restatement (First) of Contracts § 31 cmt. 
99 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §30(2).  
100 The common methodology described in this chapter also informs analysis of whether a statute that eliminated 
a common law rule should be revised. The common law ‘mirror image rule’, which required both acceptance and 
offer to match exactly in their terms, allowed opportunistic welchers to seize on technicalities to avoid 
responsibility. See D Baird and R Weisberg, ‘Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of 2-
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rejected by the Restatement (Second), seemed at odds with the parties’ likely indifference to the 
manner and mode of acceptance.  
 Another example of a default rule which arises not through statute but through the common 
law and shares the common methodology is the doctrine of constructive conditions of exchange. Until 
Lord Mansfield, unless a party had expressly conditioned its own performance on the performance of 
the other party, the law refused to imply such a term.101 Under the prior common law rule of mutual 
and independent covenants, when parties entered a bilateral executory contract, they faced the risk 
that they would have to go forward with their own performance without the other party being required 
to perform.102 Parties face uncertainty about the other party’s opportunism potential and the risk of 
investing sunk costs that will be lost if the other party does not perform.103 Because the risk is the same 
throughout all transactions, a court can intervene with an implied term, a constructive condition of 
exchange, that makes one party’s duty to perform conditional on the other party performing. This 
minimises costs more than requiring every party to provide for such a contingency, and would be widely 
accepted by those subject to the rule. The other options of screening one’s counterparty for 
opportunistic potential or bonding devices might be more costly than the law-supplied rule. The law can 
minimise transaction costs, prevent opportunism, and prevent one party from having to finance the 
other’s performance by implying default rules that accord with the parties’ intentions and prevent 
unexpected losses. The shared methodology of intervening when costs of intervention are outweighed 
by benefits thus explains implying a constructive condition of exchange into parties’ private contracts.  
B. Facilitating Contracts through Corporate Statutes and Common Law 
Corporate statutes or common law courts provide or decline to add terms to supplement contracts in 
the same manner as art 2,104 and in a manner that reflects a common methodology. They provide 
default terms to private parties’ contracts that those furnishing resources to corporations receive in 
exchange for their contribution. One such term entitles the furnisher of resources with a claim against 
                                                            
207’ (1982) 68 Virginia Law Review 1217. UCC § 2-207 reversed the common-law rule, providing that an expression 
of acceptance that states additional or different terms can still operate as an acceptance. UCC § 2-207 (1). If both 
parties’ conduct recognises the existence of a contract for sale, such contract is established even if the writings do 
not ‘establish a contract’ – any divergent terms are replaced with UCC gap-fillers. UCC § 2-207(3). Though 2-207 
was implemented to reduce transaction costs and curb opportunism, some critics have argued that the result has 
been inefficient – UCC-supplied terms may be ‘poorly suited to the transaction’: Douglas and Weisberg (ibid) 1223. 
Moreover, drafters may desire to intentionally form incomplete contracts. Sanga (n 24). Then again, the 
inefficiency of gap-filler terms may be overstated in an economy where few participants read all fine print of 
written contracts, which reduces the incentive to provide tailored, efficient terms. 
101 See EW Patterson, ‘Constructive Conditions in Contracts’ (1943) 42 Columbia Law Review 903, 907–10 (cited in 
I Ayres and G Klass, Studies in Contract Law, 9th edn (St Paul, West Publishing, 2017) 843.  
102 EA Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, 4th edn (Zachary Wolfe ed, New York, Wolters Kluwer, 2019) § 8.10. 
103 Patterson, ‘Constructive Conditions’ (1943) 910. 
104 FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416, 1417 
(discussing enabling nature of corporate statutes).  
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the firm.105 Corporate statutes govern the control106 and distribution107 for the investor and those 
statutory provisions automatically become part of the investor’s contract. The equity investor, a 
common stockholder, and the residual claimant on the assets of the firm benefit from contract terms 
supplied by statute. In addition, the common stockholder enters into other side agreements (contracts) 
including the articles of incorporation and bylaws. These contracts often provide for governance terms 
and the stock price of the investment share contract is affected by the market’s perception of these 
governance provisions.108 
 The enabling statutes create default rules for equity investors’ contracts. But should there be a 
collective intervention – either by statute or by common law – that supplies a performance obligation to 
supplement the terms of the equity investor’s contract? 109 When the law supplements the parties’ 
investor contract by supplying a performance obligation or fiduciary duty, the justification rests on a 
determination of whether there were obstacles to the parties’ reaching an express agreement on their 
own to control a problem. Absent such bargaining obstacles, the parties could reach a completely 
contingent contract to control problems, such as agency costs, and that contract would be self-
enforcing.110 
 The problem that the equity investor faces when delegating discretion to an agent is the ‘natural 
phenomenon of what might be termed the performer’s propensity to diverge caused by different 
preferences ...’.111 Agent shirking is an agency cost to the principal. Because of bounded rationality,112 
the parties may have difficulty foreseeing the myriad of ways in which an agent will act 
opportunistically. The law intervenes by supplying an implied fiduciary obligation to supplement the 
investor’s contract when it determines that the law-supplied fiduciary obligation will achieve a reduction 
in agency costs at a lesser cost than the private strategies that the parties could undertake on their own.  
 Fiduciary duty protects investors who have only a residual claim on the assets of the firm. The 
decision to protect such investors with a mandatory fiduciary duty that prevents parties from 
                                                            
105 EF Fama and MC Jensen, ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 327.  
106 Control comes in the form of the right to vote on managers. Easterbrook and Fischel, ‘Corporate Contract’ 
(1989) 1421. 
107 ibid 1430. 
108 Ibid 1431.  
109 See, e.g, MBCA § 8.30.  
110 Complete contracts are likely to be self-enforcing. See JP Kostritsky, ‘Introduction – Incomplete Contracts: 
Judicial Responses, Transactional Planning, and Litigation Strategies, symposium’ (2005) 56 Case Western Reserve 
Law Review 135, 139 fn 31 (citing JL Coleman, D. Heckathorn, and S Maser, ‘A Bargaining Approach to Default 
Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law’ (1989) 12 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 639, 640).   
111 Email from Ronald J Coffey, Professor Emeritus, Case Western Reserve University School of Law to Dean 
Kenneth B Davis, University of Wisconsin School of Law (2 May 1996, on file with author).  
112 ‘[T]he capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving problems is very small compared with the size of 
the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world ’: H Simon, Models of 
Man (London, Chapman and Hall, 1957) 198 (describing bounded rationality). 
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contracting out of the duty of loyalty113 – one of the prongs of fiduciary duty114 – stems from a belief 
that the costs of controlling the ‘propensity to diverge’ through private strategies115 are too high 
because the principal cannot see all of the alternative decisions that the agent will make.116 Other 
private devices to control agency costs include adjusting the compensation of the agent or investigating 
and providing incentives for good performance. Both mechanisms are costly or infeasible because the 
agent will not work for a knocked-down wage117 and investigation of incentive schemes may be difficult 
when the agent’s actions are unobservable. The law, following the common methodology, supplies a 
term – fiduciary duty – as the least costly alternative to solving non-contractible agency costs. 
 Further, the institutional choice of whether to supply the default rule to solve a non-contractible 
problem of agency costs by statute or by a common law rule on fiduciary duty that intervenes in the 
contract may be influenced by whether there is deep expertise in the judiciary.118 If so, and given path 
dependence of already existing case law, the common law solution may be most cost-effective. A 
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117 See JP Kostritsky, ‘One Size Does Not Fit All: A Contextual Approach to Fiduciary Duties Owed to Preferred 
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See also B Klein, ‘Contracting Costs and Residual Claims, the Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26 
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118 In this way, the common methodology of this chapter can also explain why a legislature would enact a statute 
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legal intervention in the corporate arena to expert judges in Delaware, for example. Conversely, in Ohio the 
legislature decided to take a lighter hand, constraining judicial discretion where there is less expertise and limiting 
liability for business directors. See Ohio Rev Code Ann § 1701.59 (providing statutory guidelines and codifying the 
‘business judgment’ rule). 
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statutory bright line rule, however, may create unintended costs. For example, ‘[the Model Business 
Corporation Act]’s Herculean attempt to create a comprehensive bright line rule approach to director-
conflict transactions ... breaks down in practice and requires the use of judicial discretion in reviewing 
conflict transactions’.119 
C. Declining to Intervene  
Cost minimisation and the common methodology of intervening only when the benefits outweigh the 
costs also explains legislative and common law refusals to intervene. Article 2 adopts a penalty default 
approach to a missing quantity term in a sale of goods contract. If the parties have not specified a 
quantity term in the contract, the UCC refuses to supply one.120 This refusal incentivises parties to 
include the quantity term themselves or risk non-enforcement of the contract.121 The legislature, in the 
UCC, refuses to intervene because arriving at a quantity ex post by a court would be too costly122 and 
the costs will be lower if the parties agree on the quantity term ex ante.123 The difference in prospective 
costs justifies the legislature’s refusal to intervene. 
 The cost explanation for the refusal to supply a quantity term finds further support if one 
considers how the law treats a missing quantity term in the context of long-term requirements 
contracts. There, the law intervenes with an implied term of good faith to determine the quantity.124 
The divergent approach in that context is consistent with the common methodology of intervening only 
if doing so increases net benefits for the parties to the exchange. If a penalty default information forcing 
rationale theory is subscribed to, then the court should arguably refuse to intervene and force the 
parties to supply the quantity even in long-term contracts.  
 When, however, parties face obstacles to specifying a quantity because of bounded rationality, 
which limits the ability to predict the quantity in a long-term contract, the law intervenes. It measures 
the quantity by the party with the discretion to specify a quantity, such as a buyer in a requirements 
contract, by an amount that may be demanded in good faith.125 When, however, the parties face low 
obstacles to achieving a completely contingent contract, as in a discrete transaction, the court refuses to 
supply a quantity term.  
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 The information-disclosing penalty default rationale that explains 2-201 does not make sense 
when bounded rationality prevents parties from determining the quantity. In such cases, when the 
‘parties can operate only in a second-best world’126 beset by bounded rationality, when problems of 
opportunism might arise over a long-term contract, and when costs of devising express constraints are 
high, the law, through a statute such as 2-306 and the courts through case law,127 imply a term of good 
faith to constrain the announced quantity. In such cases the cost-minimising solution would be the 
implied term of good faith, so under the common methodology the law intervenes.  
 When the debate about missing quantity terms is situated in the context of barriers to 
bargaining that exist in different degrees in discrete and long-term requirements contracts with a 
comparison of alternative solutions to determine which offers the greatest net benefits under a 
remediableness analysis,128 a structured approach based on the common methodology of assessing 
barriers to bargaining and a net benefit improvement approach to gap-filling emerges as the one that 
underlies judicial and statutory interventions. 
 In other situations, the common law will decline to intervene in parties’ contracts with a 
fiduciary duty. The law generally refuses to intervene in a preferred stockholder’s investment contract 
and such decisions rest on the structure – the common methodology – articulated earlier: will the 
addition of a term to the contract minimise cost while maximising value? If implication of a term for one 
party – the preferred stockholders – would result in a hit to the other claimants (common stockholders) 
who made their investments based on risks and priced them based on a lack of fiduciary protections, 
rearranging those risks would be destabilising.129 Moreover, courts should not add implied protections 
when the claimants, such as preferred stockholders, can easily employ a variety of other private 
strategies to protect themselves. In the case of venture capitalists holding preferred stock, their 
strategies include staged financing130 and board control,131 making extra-contractual protections 
superfluous and costly.  
 A comparative cost–benefit analysis underlies decisions on whether courts should intervene to 
grant preferred stockholders implied protections not contracted for. The law declines to imply a 
fiduciary duty to protect preferred stockholders. In such cases the intervener implicitly uses the 
common methodology to decide that certain parties belong to ‘classes of cases where the transactors 
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are able to employ private strategies that control the performer’s propensity to diverge’.132 There would 
be no reason to intervene, especially when there are offsetting contracting around costs that might 
follow the intervention. 
 When preferred stockholders ask for additional rights or protections not included in their 
contracts, courts also must wrestle with whether and why to grant such protections and use a 
framework that assesses whether the preferred stockholders could protect themselves and whether 
adding implied protections would result in an overall net benefit.133 Preferred stockholders incorporate 
rights, limitations and preferences in the articles or charter of the issuer.134 A typical statute, such as 
that operating in Delaware, makes the legislative statement that special rights, limitations and 
preferences must be in the articles to be effective.135 The statute thus begins the process of enabling 
other contracts that follow, including the articles or charter. These contracts or add-ons follow and 
include bylaws or regulations.136 Shareholder agreements or stock purchase agreements – additional 
contracts – may have expanded terms that are extracted by the original purchasers.137  
 Once those rights, preferences and limitations are stated, the question arises as to whether the 
common law courts, or another intervenor, should intervene and afford preferred stockholders special 
fiduciary protections beyond those afforded all common stockholders that were not explicitly in their 
bargained-for contract.138 
 When deciding whether to imply such protections, common law courts must situate the 
question of implying a term into an overall context of bargained-for exchange and the principal/agent 
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context.139 An adjudicator must address the problem that parties face when there is a delegation issue 
due to the separation of ownership and control.140 Preferred stockholders face agency costs and the 
danger of opportunism when they furnish resources to an agent. Will implying a fiduciary duty maximise 
welfare by constraining opportunism and controlling moral hazard? When there are multiple claimants 
or investors, including preferred and common stockholders, what is the agent’s duty? Presumably the 
agent is ‘tasked with honoring the claims of the different types of investors’.141 The agent must assume 
the task of operating the firm and administering the claims possessed by the capital furnishers, including 
the preferred. The agent may take steps that might adversely affect one set of claimants, such as the 
preferred, even though there is no effect on the overall asset pool of the firm.142  
 In deciding if the preferred need protection supplied by a common law fiduciary duty, the courts 
could adopt an ‘all or nothing approach’ and deny any fiduciary protection beyond that owed to all 
common stockholders not to waste assets or it could extend fiduciary protection to all preferred 
stockholders.143 In general, the courts deny added implied fiduciary protections to preferred 
stockholders. When the preferred can negotiate for contractual protection, as in the venture capital 
context, adding a term would bestow a gift to the preferred they did not bargain for and upset the basic 
risk/return profile of their investment, a cost that mitigates against adoption. Adding the term would 
also cause a ‘hit’ in terms of reduced value to other claimants such as common stockholders.  
 However, when substantial barriers to negotiating protections exist, as when preferred stock is 
issued when the holders have no direct bargaining power and the preferred are subsequent purchasers 
trading on relatively inefficient markets where pricing signals are attenuated,144 and there is no 
underwriter helping the preferred, there may be reason for a common law court to imply fiduciary 
protection, at least when the market price does not correctly value weaknesses in the protections that 
the preferred has under its contracts with the firm.145 
VIII. Mandatory Disclosure in Securities, Real Estate and Consumer 
Contexts: What Works? 
The three examples discussed below demonstrate that legislative strategies of intervention that add 
terms to contracts through mandated disclosure depend first on a decision that parties’ private 
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strategies or common law solutions may not work to effectively control a problem, thereby laying the 
groundwork for intervention. The disparate success of disclosure laws, with real-estate disclosure and 
securities laws working more effectively than consumer disclosure laws,146 underlines how important 
the comparative cost–benefit analysis is. If consumer laws add costs without enhancing consumer 
decision-making, then the legislature should consider other strategies that are more effective and find 
less costly legislative solutions.  
A. Securities 
In the context of contracts for the sale of securities, the legislature’s decision of whether to intervene to 
mandate disclosure depends on whether such disclosure will not otherwise occur. By intervening to 
require disclosure and to forbid any material misstatements, the law can control an agency problem that 
would otherwise be uncontrolled. The law constantly assesses whether the benefits of intervention 
outweigh the costs. The benefits of the Exchange Act of 1934 disclosures are thought to outweigh the 
costs because the disclosures promote accurate pricing of securities, fostering allocative efficiency.147 
 When investors buy stocks and enter into contracts as equity investors, questions will arise as to 
whether managers in the firm will make all the material information available to the investors or 
whether a collective intervention to force the disclosure of information is needed either in the form of a 
common law rule or a statute. 
 The management and the shareholders have a conflict of interest – an agency cost that will 
sometimes cause the manager to act opportunistically at the expense of shareholders. If shareholders 
fear the non-disclosure of material information, the manager will be ‘the primary loser’.148 To convince 
prospective shareholders that all relevant information is being disclosed, management may try to signal 
that disclosures are accurate using auditors.149 Management may also invest in stock options, signaling 
that the information has been disclosed. The manager could suffer losses if it bought stock at a high 
price that did not reflect negative material information. The manager’s own investment is a self-
regulating device against material non-disclosures to investors. This illustrates how voluntary disclosure 
may occur without legal intervention.  
 Moreover, if managers of companies or promoters acquiring new businesses and selling their 
services to investors all must compete for investments, and investors are rational, self-interested 
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failures to disclose will have negative consequences and result in losses for managers and promoters 
because rational investors will invest elsewhere.150 Thus, such managers will be incentivised to 
voluntarily disclose information to investors or will face the possibility of losing investors. 
 Another means of equalising information between buyers and sellers of securities is for the 
buyers to contract for disclosure. However, significant bargaining obstacles may hinder such contractual 
agreements including the lack of equal bargaining power, lack of expertise and lack of sophistication. 
Buyers will not know what questions to ask to secure disclosure, and when buyers do ask, sellers will 
selectively contract with buyers to whom there is no duty to disclose a strategy which keeps the 
information hidden.151 The same obstacles that prevent a buyer from formulating the right questions to 
ask may also render common law fraud actions ineffective. Without the questions being asked, holding 
the seller accountable for misleading answers may be difficult under common law fraud. Moreover, 
rescission as a remedy in common law fraud actions may be an ineffective institutional response.  
 Because obstacles to self-induced disclosure exist,152 the law intervenes through statute by 
requiring disclosure of information to investors both through the initial registration statement and 
though subsequent regular periodic filings. The intervener – the legislature – implements a law affecting 
a private contract/sale between a broker and a buyer if intervention in the form of mandated disclosure 
is justified using a net-benefit or welfare-improvement methodology. Disclosure can avoid the 
inefficiencies that would occur if investors tried to self-protect by gathering the information on their 
own.153 The disclosure of the information affects the pricing of the underlying securities and contractual 
behaviour. Investors enter contracts with their broker on the basis of information about a company 
released in a report or prospectus. The investor ‘can effectively free ride on the accurate pricing 
generated by the buying and selling of sophisticated investors’.154  
 The Exchange Act of 1934 requires disclosure on an ongoing basis of information about the 
dealings between the management and the company.155 Why would federal law require such 
disclosure? One answer, consistent with the thesis in this chapter, is that requiring disclosure 
economises on transaction costs that investors would otherwise face in controlling agency costs.156 
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Investors face an agency cost when they buy stock because often the promotor or the manager may 
have purchased property or other businesses and may therefore have conflicting interests. The 
securities laws force the disclosure of such self-interested dealings.  
 Mandatory disclosure may therefore be justified in efficiency terms. It may be more cost-
effective to mandate disclosure of a uniform variety than to have all promoters or managers negotiate 
individually for disclosure ‘where the outcome is not likely to vary among firms and thus the costs of 
complying with a one size fits all rule are less than the costs of negotiating individual levels of 
disclosure’.157 Because investors would want managers to disclose information on matters such as 
conflicts of interest as a means of controlling agency costs, and managers would be willing to disclose as 
a way of encouraging transactions and overcoming investors’ disinclination to invest without such 
disclosure, the mandatory rule is efficient. Both investors and managers would want disclosure of such 
information and a one-size-fits-all rule lowers the cost of controlling the agency problem.158 
B. Real Estate Disclosure 
Mandated seller disclosure laws in real-estate transactions offer another instance when statutes 
intervene in private contracts and displace common law rules. Seller disclosure laws help to clarify the 
seller’s obligations. Under the common law, those obligations remained unclear as courts struggled with 
differentiating between patent and latent defects. 
 The question is whether voluntary disclosure obligations under the common law would be 
effective in solving a problem of asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers and, if not, 
would mandated statutory disclosures solve that problem more effectively. If so, then intervention 
would yield overall net benefits and maximise welfare. 
 Prior to 1984, many states followed the doctrine of caveat emptor in real-estate transactions. 
Ohio is illustrative, and precluded a purchaser’s recovery for a structural defect when the defect was 
discoverable, the buyer had the opportunity to examine the premises and the seller did not engage in 
fraud.159 Courts presumed that the ‘duty falls upon the purchaser to make inquiry and examination’.160 
This approach effectively precluded rescission for patent defects unless the seller was guilty of common 
law fraud, such as concealment. 
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 In 1984, the California Supreme Court set forth the principles for a seller’s duty to disclose red 
flags in contracts for the sale of residential real-estate property.161 By the early 2000s, a majority of 
states mandated seller disclosure, often in the form of a statute.162  
 The asymmetry-of-information problem explains why states adopted statutes. Absent disclosure 
statutes, the seller will often fail to disclose information to the buyer. Sellers with high-quality real 
estate will then withdraw from the market.163 Subsequently, buyers will assign only an average price for 
the real estate and sellers will not be able to charge a premium for higher-quality real estate.164 This 
process continues, resulting in what economists called the ‘lemons’ problem.165 
 If mandatory seller disclosure laws can solve this ‘lemons’ problem, sellers can release higher-
quality properties to the market and receive a higher price. As one author studying the effect of these 
laws predicted: ‘housing prices should rise’.166 Empirical data confirms such a rise in prices following the 
adoption of seller disclosure statutes and a lowered risk premium for real estate. Mandated disclosure 
laws permit buyers to identify higher-quality real estate and allow sellers to realise the full value of such 
property.  
 The success of such disclosure statutes in solving asymmetries of information and the ‘lemons’ 
problem more effectively than the common law may be explained, in part, by a phenomenon in which 
people cheat less when forced to sign a form pledging not to cheat (as on an exam).167 Although 
cheaters are omnipresent in society, and although some people will always cheat, others ‘want to be 
honest’ and when furnished with an ethical reminder that requires their pledge, will cheat less.168 
Having the seller sign a form that mandates disclosure of information may reduce the tendency to 
withhold information in a way that was not present under the common law rules, which only prohibited 
fraud when there was uncertainty about what was material and what was a patent or latent defect in 
the premises. Statutory interventions in sale contracts increased wealth and offered a comparative 
advantage over the common law in solving the ‘lemons’ problem, thereby justifying intervention under 
the shared methodology.  
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C. Consumer Disclosure 
The rise of standardised contracts has prompted legislative intervention for more disclosure. 
Legislatures and courts have intervened in consumer contracts by mandating the disclosure of certain 
terms169 and by regulating the process by which the terms of the contract are disclosed. In certain 
instances, the seller must make the term conspicuous to a buyer.170 Other disclosure laws require 
insurers to disclose that buyers can buy different types of insurance without bundling the insurance in a 
single policy.171 
 The goals of legislative intervention included increased consumer awareness of the terms of a 
contract by making them more accessible and less hidden. At the same time, the legislature hoped that 
such disclosure would increase competition among providers or sellers172 and improve decision-making 
by consumers.173 
 Lawmakers find disclosure an appealing method of regulating contracts because it avoids direct 
legislative regulation or modification of a contract’s terms – thereby preserving autonomy for the 
parties. Yet, the failures of mandated disclosure as a method of improving decision-making underline 
the importance of using the common methodology for assessing whether the net benefits of additional 
disclosure legislation outweigh the costs of such intervention. An assessment should include the efficacy 
of the mandated disclosure and the negative ‘unintended consequences’ of such disclosure,174 and 
other harms. 
 The success of disclosure mandates depends on parties actually reading, analysing, and 
understanding the disclosed terms. Recent empirical studies of licence agreements show that despite 
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the disclosure requirements and increased accessibility of contract terms, parties fail to read the 
contracts.175 That failure initially made common-law solutions ineffective as many common-law 
doctrines are premised on parties having a duty to read. Today, the difficulties that the common law 
faces in solving assent in standardised contracts is reflected in the failure of courts to utilise s 211 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.176  
 Yet, disclosure by statutory mandates also results in overload and accumulation problems that 
interfere with the ability of disclosees to ‘understand, assimilate and analyse the avalanche of 
information’.177 The mountain of information also results in fewer consumers reading contracts. As 
disclosures increase and disclosees face an accumulation of disclosures, consumers are less inclined to 
read the disclosures.178 
 Moreover, problems such as illiteracy, innumeracy and a lack of comprehensibility persist, 
which, when coupled with a failure to read, render the required disclosures meaningless. In some 
instances, the benefits may be slight compared to the burdens. Even if the disclosures would improve 
decision-making, those subject to the mandates often devise strategies to undermine the effectiveness 
of the disclosures. One such strategy is to ‘bury the lede’ and highlight other unimportant provisions.179 
 When legislatures intervene to achieve broad social goals (that differ from the parties’ private 
goals) and to improve private decisions, the decision-maker must still consider whether there are other 
costs on future contracting parties that would more than offset the benefits obtained by the statutory 
intervention. The failures with mandated disclosure and the ever-cascading disclosures of more 
information180 underline the importance of devising legislative strategies that account for how those 
subject to the laws will react (including both the disclosers and the disclosees). To achieve legislative 
goals of fostering better decision-making by consumers, legislators may need to adopt targeted 
strategies demonstrated to be effective. These could include requiring disclosers to use pretested 
language that consumers understand, rely on alternative strategies that forbid certain terms (balloon 
payments) if consumers will not react to mere disclosures, or nudge consumers to better outcomes by 
devising default rules (opting out of savings for a 401k). Another approach is embedded in the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau regulation of home mortgage contracts. The goal is to adopt ‘newly 
simplified mortgage disclosures ... tested in labs for readability and efficacy’.181 
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 To address the failure of disclosure informational strategies to achieve readership, two authors 
have suggested a new approach to consumer protection laws tailored to the problem that arises when 
consumers have an overly optimistic understanding of terms in the contract that does not match the 
reality of the meaning of the terms.  
 The approach championed by Ayres and Schwartz diverges from efforts to improve the 
readability and intelligibility of the content of all terms, seeking instead to ascertain through testing 
whether ‘consumers held accurate beliefs about the terms’.182 If so, the terms could be buried in the 
contract because, in those cases, the consumers would expect those terms even if they had not read 
them. Where, however, the consumer’s expectation about a term relied on by one party is more 
optimistic than the reality, special precautions would need to be taken – warning boxes – to highlight 
such terms. Without such boxes, the terms would not be enforceable.183 The advantage of the Ayres 
and Schwartz approach is that it would limit ‘consumers’ scarce attention’184 to terms that consumers 
falsely understand to be more protective than the reality.185 Disclosure would focus on terms likely to 
surprise the consumer, and would save on the costly and often pyrrhic approach of mandating 
readability and conspicuousness when most consumers simply do not read contracts even when they 
are accessible through legislative or judicial mandates. Their approach would be consistent with the 
shared methodology suggested earlier – opting for an intervention when costs and burdens do not 
outweigh the benefits of enhancing decision-making and overall welfare. 
IX. Terms Forbidden by Legislature: Regulatory Intervention and its 
Limits 
Sometimes the legislature takes a different interventional stance. Instead of trying to facilitate 
contracting by providing off-the-shelf default rules or gap-fillers when barriers to bargaining prevent the 
parties from reaching an optimal agreement, the legislature sometimes chooses to forbid the parties 
from enacting a term in their contract – or provides that if such a term is included, the law will withhold 
enforcement. These statutory interventions require a different analytical framework for justifying 
interventions than when law intervenes to facilitate bargains.  
 Legislatures regulate contracts by passing laws that modify or limit the private contractual 
choices parties can make. For example, the law might forbid the parties from entering into contracts 
that contain covenants not to compete.186 When the legislature intervenes in this manner, it withholds 
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enforcement of private contracts to achieve certain broad social objectives, or to conform to social 
norms, even though the parties themselves benefited from the contract.  
 Examining how private parties respond to one particular statutory intervention can facilitate an 
understanding of the reverberative effects of statutory interventions in private contracting and the need 
to account for such effects whenever there is an intervention in order to determine if intervention will 
lead to welfare improvement.  
 California’s statutory prohibition of covenants not to compete provides one example.187 Such 
covenants are ‘ubiquitous’ in employment contracts,188 both for high-level management employees 
and, more recently, for lower-level non-managerial employees.189  
 Prohibiting covenants not to compete raises the question of when and why such intervention is 
required. How does the intervention affect the achievement of the employer’s goals in including such 
covenants, such as the deterrence of poaching valuable employees? Further, how can firms be 
incentivised to invest in training for employees given the potential for poaching if such covenants are 
not enforced?190  
 When jurisdictions forbid such clauses, do parties devise ways to circumvent the legislative 
prohibitions in unexpected ways, drawing on informal relational enforcement of otherwise 
unenforceable clauses? If so, what does this reveal about the limits of legislative interventions in private 
contracts and the need to account for private bargaining when statutes affect such contracts? 
 Legislatures that sanction non-compete clauses are acting to serve broad public goals, 
responding to concerns that without the protection of a non-compete, employers who invest in 
employee training will be victimised by other employers hiring away those highly trained employees. 
Empirical data show that jurisdictions that enforce such clauses ‘increase … firm-sponsored training for 
primarily high skill and high earnings occupations’.191 A firm’s willingness to invest in training and 
protection against post-firm employment are linked. The enforcement of covenants not to compete also 
affects worker mobility, with enforcement of such covenants reducing worker mobility and the non-
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enforcement of such clauses increasing mobility and promoting innovation.192 Variation in enforcement 
may also affect hiring with reduced enforcement of such clauses leading to a decreased willingness to 
hire employees without experience. This follows logically because, without the protection of the non-
compete, firms may decrease training investment and rely instead on other firms to train employees.193 
The enforcement of non-competes may have positive effects on wages, at least among physicians.194 
 To determine whether the legislature should deny enforcement of such clauses by modulating 
enforcement according to the level of managerial expertise, or by operating under the common law to 
enforce to such clauses as long as they are reasonable, the effects – both positive and negative – on 
worker mobility, wages and hiring are all relevant. California’s decision to adopt a bright line prohibition 
on covenants not to compete demonstrates a legislative determination that the benefits of a strict 
statutory rule outweigh the costs of a common law rule assessing the reasonableness of the restriction.  
 However, the presence of the statutory ban on covenants not to compete only blocks public 
enforcement of such covenants. Denying public enforcement cannot suppress efficient bargaining 
between parties. If there is an efficient exchange, barring one form of exchange, such as a contract with 
a covenant not to compete, it will not prevent parties from reaching their goals in a cost-effective 
manner that protects the employer and the employee.  
 Such bargaining has been ignored when legislatures absolutely prohibit non-compete covenants. 
Parties faced with such a prohibition appear to deliberately enter into unenforceable contracts. These 
contracts contain both covenants not to compete and post-employment severance payments to be 
furnished in installments – with both the non-compete and the installments being legally 
unenforceable.195 The employer is incentivised to make the severance payments as long as the 
employee refrains from competing. Similarly, the employee will refrain from competing in order to 
secure the unenforceable severance payment. In effect, the parties informally enforce a contract 
covenant that is unenforceable by statute.  
 Thus, one cost of the California intervention is that many parties contract around the prohibition 
and rely on informal enforcement of unenforceable contracts.196 This cost needs to be weighed against 
the benefits of the statute. It is possible that the private informal arrangements that parties enter into 
may be a less costly result than public enforcement of a covenant not to compete. The parties institute a 
relationship built on trust in which each monitors the performance of the other. The statute banning 
covenants works in tandem with informal private arrangements to achieve the goals of the common law 
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in balancing the interests of the employer in preserving an incentive to invest with the employee’s 
interest in worker mobility.  
 The non-compete example demonstrates the importance of understanding bargained-for 
exchange in evaluating statutory and common law interventions outlawing certain contracts. That 
bargained-for exchange model demonstrates that parties will find a way to achieve their private goals 
even when public statutory law blocks one way of achieving those goals; efficient bargaining cannot be 
suppressed.  
 The question should be whether the reverberative effects of the statute are more costly and 
whether they exceed the welfare benefits from adoption of the statute. Those benefits could be 
considered in the narrow social sense looking only at the two contracting parties or more broadly. 
 Legislative prohibition can take a different form of blocking an exchange when the legislature 
outlaws a certain type of transaction. Such prohibitions may cause unintended costs and demonstrate 
the limits of legislation that contravenes parties’ private preferences. One such prohibition is contained 
in the Sarbanes-Oxley (‘SOX’) legislation.197 Responding to Enron abuses, s 402 outlawed loans to 
executives.198 Prior to SOX, companies could, for example, lend money to an executive to buy a house. 
One problem with the SOX prohibition is that ‘because if one form of compensation is restricted, 
managers can renegotiate their contracts to make up for the loss’.199 The legislation has had limited 
effect and may have led to more inefficient compensation arrangements.200 After SOX, instead of 
loaning money to executives, the company will simply give the executive a one-time bonus. The 
company will swallow the cost to recruit the executive and the company will not be reimbursed as it 
would have under a conventional loan. The prohibition on loans may also have the undesirable effect of 
prohibiting loans to facilitate stock purchases, thereby depriving companies of a key mechanism for 
‘aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests’.201 Those costs of intervention may outweigh 
the benefits. Only by taking the private exchange into account can those costs be factored into the costs 
of legislative intervention. 
X. Conclusion 
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Although statutes have sometimes been neglected in contract law, it is palpably clear that statutes play 
an ever-expanding role in contracts. Traditionally, these statutory adoptions have been regarded as 
intrusions into the private world of contract. This chapter argues that to assess the significance of these 
statutory developments, one must situate them in the context of bargained-for exchange. When so 
situated, legislation, like the common law, is an institution for minimising the costs of exchange. 
Legislation shares a common methodology with the common law when it formulates decisions about 
whether and how to add terms to contract. Intervention must depend on whether adding terms will 
increase welfare. That analysis depends on whether the parties can achieve their goals without any 
intervention and whether intervention will reduce the costs of exchange without introducing offsetting 
costs that outweigh the benefits. The framework is useful in explaining why and when courts or statutes 
intervene to facilitate contracting with rules or implied terms when obstacles prevent parties from 
contracting to solve a problem. It also sheds light on when and why courts or legislatures should decline 
to intervene, and on when and why disclosure mandated by statutes works or fails. The framework also 
illuminates the limits and offsetting costs of statutory intervention when parties devise mechanisms to 
circumvent statutes that forbid terms in contracts. 
